The Myth of the "Kingpin Strategy"

CJNG’s growth wasn’t accidental—it was the result of the fragmentation and weakening of rival cartels.

For decades, both Mexican and U.S. authorities have relied heavily on a strategy rooted in the so-called “kingpin” doctrine—capture or kill the boss, and the organization will fall apart. It’s a policy that gained global attention with the 1993 killing of Pablo Escobar in Colombia and was later imported into Mexico with the militarized war on drugs declared by former President Felipe Calderón in 2006. On paper, the logic seems sound. But in practice, dismantling the head of a criminal enterprise rarely collapses the body. Instead, it mutates, regenerating like a hydra, sometimes into something far worse.

The recent replacement of "La Perris" by "El Jardinero" in Sinaloa is just the latest chapter in this pattern. Behind the nicknames are much deeper issues: structural violence, a broken justice system, and a legacy of reactive policy-making that has left Mexico bloodied but no closer to peace.

The Rise of “El Jardinero” in Sinaloa

Though public information on El Jardinero remains limited—perhaps intentionally—sources within Mexico’s intelligence community suggest he emerged swiftly after the downfall of “La Perris,” a regional Sinaloa Cartel lieutenant operating in the Sierra de Badiraguato. Unlike his predecessor, who operated with a degree of discretion, El Jardinero is reportedly more aggressive and expansionist in his tactics, recruiting younger sicarios and making incursions into contested territory formerly held by rival factions.

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